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A Eulogy for the EULA 
Miriam A. Cherry* 
Rakoff shook his brightly dyed red hair as he shivered alongside 
the others waiting for the bullet train.  It was a miserably cold 
morning, but Rakoff’s fellow passengers didn’t seem to mind.  
Most of those standing on the platform were taking their spare 
moments to work in the global workspace.  It looked like they were 
talking to themselves, typing on invisible keyboards, or blinking, 
but in fact they were working, completing crowdsourcing tasks.  
Other waiting passengers were interacting with business contacts 
by projecting their avatars out into the virtuality.   It was cold, but 
there was not long to wait now; smart sensors gathered a continu-
ous stream of data about riders to re-route the trains according to 
where they were needed.  About two minutes later, the bullet 
train arrived and Rakoff’s implant chimed as train fare was auto-
matically deducted from his UCoin crypto currency account.   
As Rakoff’s kilt brushed past the doors, terms, conditions, and 
limited liability provisions from the train downloaded into his im-
plant and flitted across his vision in an exhausting and unreada-
ble blur, leaving him dizzy and nauseated.  Such a tedious, use-
less, and annoying waste of perfectly good computing power made 
him figuratively (as well as literally) ill.  Multiple times per day, 
every minute of the day, in every city across the global village, 
every netizen was bombarded with legal terms that no one could 
negotiate, let alone understand, even if they had tried.  Which 
they hadn’t, because who would waste their time so pointlessly?  
Such terms were a particular source of frustration because their 
lengthy and cumbersome files interfaced especially poorly with the 
visual implant that had become so popular during the last year.  
Not only were these legal documents tedious and impossible to 
avoid seeing, but they often left implant users with a terrible 
headache that lasted for hours.  In response to consumer com-
plaints, companies blamed these types of headaches on bugs in the 
interface with the implant.  Whatever the cause, ouch! 
  
 * Professor of Law, Saint Louis University; B.A., 1996, Dartmouth College; J.D., 
1999, Harvard Law School.  Thank you to Chancellor John Murray and to the editors of 
Duquesne Law Review for their kind invitation to contribute to this symposium. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447421 
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*** 
Just last week over a sushi lunch, Rakoff’s sister Margaret, an 
attorney, had tried to explain to Rakoff why those contractual pro-
visions existed, giving so many people with visual implants—and 
even those without—headaches.  She explained that all the fine 
print and legalese, which she called “an adhesion contract,” was 
an old-fashioned effort by businesses to limit their legal liability.1  
Generally, Margaret told him, the terms did not allow for negotia-
tion—they were on a “take-it or leave-it basis.”2  Most people never 
read them—because they were difficult to understand and it took 
too long, for only a tiny benefit, perhaps.    
As Margaret tied back her long hair so it didn’t get into the 
wasabi, she explained that back last century, when national gov-
ernments still had more power than transnational corporations, a 
United States Supreme Court case had strengthened the enforce-
ability of such adhesion contracts.3  The case involved language 
printed on the back of a cruise ship ticket, and the plaintiff was 
forced to bring suit in a port on the other side of the country based 
on the fine print.4  When the influential and business-friendly 
Seventh Circuit had also decided to enforce adhesion contracts 
against people who (today it seemed antiquated) bought software 
in a box, it opened the door even further for these contracts.5  In 
the 2000s, “End User License Agreement” or “EULA” contracts 
became quite common.6  These “contracts” required scrolling 
through terms and clicking “I AGREE.”  Other websites had the 
terms and conditions linked on their website.  Courts dithered 
  
 1. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Ad-
hesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). 
 2. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1177. 
 3. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding a forum 
selection clause that was part of the printed boilerplate on a cruise line ticket). 
 4. Id. at 593-95. 
 5. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir.1996) (where a purchas-
er of software ignored license terms inside the software box, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a 
refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends) may be a 
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”); see also Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 6. See, e.g., Licensed Application End User License Agreement, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Apr. 
24, 2014).  
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over the next two decades about whether to enforce these so-called 
“shrinkwraps,’ “clickwraps,” and “browsewraps.”7 
Of course, Margaret explained, if the terms of an EULA or any 
other adhesion contract became so one-sided or overreaching that 
the terms were oppressive or constituted an unfair surprise, a doc-
trine called “unconscionability” protected the consumer.8  But 
those cases had to involve really outrageous conduct, like forbid-
ding a lawsuit altogether, waiving gross negligence, requiring the 
customer to travel to Mongolia to bring a case, or a complete waiv-
er of any damages.   
Between bites of his favorite veggie roll, Rakoff had asked why 
any business would put an unenforceable term in a contract, when 
it was, well, unenforceable?  Margaret explained that in the case 
of some consumers, just reading a contract provision that prevent-
ed a lawsuit or made it more difficult would be enough to put them 
off from bringing a lawsuit or even contacting a lawyer.  Although 
market economics would dictate that firms would compete and the 
harsh terms would disappear, the opposite seemed to have hap-
pened.9  When one firm increased the harshness of its terms, other 
firms actually copied the harsh terms.  And so the terms and con-
ditions grew longer and longer and harsher and harsher on con-
sumers.  The cost savings were (mostly) not passed along to con-
sumers but rather seemed to be kept as additional profits for the 
companies implementing them. 
While a group of law professors, lawyers, and consumer advo-
cates had discussed, debated, and mostly complained about one-
  
 7. Shrinkwraps are agreements encased in plastic wrap that typically accompany 
software compact discs.  Clickwraps and browsewraps are digital agreements.  A clickwrap 
requires clicking agreement in some manner, such as on an “accept” box.  A browsewrap is 
a hyperlink that is designated as an agreement by the words “Terms of Use” or similar 
language.  NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 3 (2013).  
For further discussion of courts’ movement to accept these types of agreements in light of 
ProCD, see Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1327 (2011). 
 8. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result.”). 
 9. See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992-
93 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t has been hard to find decisions holding terms invalid on the ground 
that something is wrong with non-negotiable terms in form contracts . . . .  As long as the 
market is competitive, sellers must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable; onerous terms 
just lead to lower prices.”). 
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sided terms and conditions and unequal bargaining power for dec-
ades,10 inertia largely carried the day.  Courts and legislatures 
were either captured by the business lobbies or else had not 
seemed to think this a particularly pressing issue.  Since no one 
thought they’d have a problem when they entered a contract or 
engaged in a routine, mundane transaction, such as paying a de-
livery drone, people still viewed these terms and conditions as 
largely irrelevant, or perhaps a necessary evil. 
Until last year.  Google Glass and the Microsoft Bracelet had 
satisfied the technocrati for the past decade, enabling a visual or 
tactile overlay and eye-click searching or touch-zooming through-
out the virtuality.  But just in the last year, an embedded implant 
promised far more speed, agility, and above all, an employment 
advantage.  If you had an implant, steady employment and eco-
nomic security were within reach.  If you didn’t, you might get 
stuck on the wrong side of the digital divide, or maybe doing ran-
dom dead-end, no-benefit, poorly paid part-time work on 
crowdsourcing websites.  Perhaps it spoke to the situation that in 
the last ten months alone, twenty million people had decided to 
try the visual implant.  It was an amazing change that sped up all 
the innovations of the ’net and the virtuality from a generation 
before.  Information was largely costless now and people could 
work, share knowledge, and connect with each other easily all 
around the globe.  But the terms and conditions hadn’t changed.  
No, they were as frustrating and intractable as ever as they creat-
ed implant headaches for millions. 
*** 
Knowing the history of the useless and annoying terms was only 
partially satisfactory as Rakoff stumbled onto the bullet train, still 
reeling from the blinding headache.  He almost tripped from the 
after-aura left behind as he shuffled to his seat, struggling to sit 
down and simultaneously accommodate his kilt.  It was unusual 
  
 10. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 204 (5th ed. 2011) (“Econ-
omists, however, recognize that situation-specific monopolies created after parties of une-
qual bargaining power agree on a price are particularly likely to suggest inefficient 
terms.”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1265 (2003) (“After the purchase, however, the buyers 
had already invested in the particular products, and returning them would have required 
expending additional time and effort.  Although the sellers were not monopolists at the 
time of sale, they enjoyed a situation-specific monopoly vis-à-vis customers who had already 
purchased their merchandise.  Of course, they could not have taken advantage of this by 
charging a higher price, because the price term had already been agreed upon (and paid).  
Unable to renegotiate price, the sellers had an incentive to try to capture benefits of their 
monopoly position by providing low-quality terms.”). 
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that he had talked with Margaret about this topic . . . because 
Rakoff wasn’t a lawyer.  Oh, no.  Unlike his straight-laced sister, 
he tended to skate on the edge of the wrong side of the law.   
Now, Rakoff wasn’t exactly a hacker either.  No, he preferred to 
call himself a “disruptivist technological innovator.”  Okay, he’d 
done his share of prank hacks with friends back when he was a 
teenager—who hadn’t?  Most of them with his friend Nancy and 
her jet black hair hacking along with him, before she decided to 
follow her dad’s example and started medical school.  Nancy was 
the better hacker of the two of them, if Rakoff was entirely honest 
with himself.  When Rakoff had hacked in his twenties, well, that 
was only because of a sense of outrage.  Big data monitoring of 
bathrooms through biological sensors (even if it was the best way 
to figure out which bathrooms to service) was a ridiculous invasion 
of privacy.  And then there was that “innocent” virus that ended 
his last employer’s surveillance of workers’ off-duty web activity.  
And ended his time there, too.  But lately Rakoff had sworn off his 
hacktivist ways.  He had promised Nancy that he’d stop.  Granted, 
she wasn’t talking to him much lately, but Rakoff was still trying 
to keep his word to her. 
Forget thinking about Nancy, he told himself.  Get productive, 
get back to working.  Rakoff transported a holographic avatar of 
himself to catch up with his coding supervisor.  But after only ten 
minutes in the global workspace, he was rudely interrupted with a 
shock and what was almost a blinding bolt of unpleasantness.  
Those damn terms and conditions from the train.  Again!  Glanc-
ing around the train car, about seventy percent of the passengers 
were wincing in pain.  Rakoff seethed with annoyance.  Bad 
enough to get a headache when first getting on the train, but now 
a second time too?  This was unusual.  What in the web was going 
on? 
Rakoff projected several data search bots into the virtuality and 
had them drill down for some big data crunching.  The first bot 
showed nothing strange.   
The second bot picked up a data trail through a paid big data 
stream and it promised to be juicy—data from an online retailer 
and its executives.  Well, this called for more drilling.  Rakoff 
spent the rest of his train ride following and directing the second 
bot’s trail through the paid data stream.  There were passwords 
and company firewalls that impeded him, but Rakoff didn’t care 
and didn’t stop until he found it.  And there it was.  The e-mail 
exchange between the CEO of the online retailer and the compa-
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ny’s attorney.  Turns out that the terms and conditions headache 
was not a “bug” at all.  Rakoff gasped at what he read next.     
The headache was programmed in on purpose.  In fact, the 
headache was a deliberate feature of the terms and conditions.  In 
an e-mail exchange that Rakoff quickly scanned, it seemed that 
the attorney was actually approving of his client’s actions.  The 
attorney noted that if there ever was a problem and the company 
needed to prove that the customers knew about the terms, they 
could easily prove it in court through the existence of the head-
aches.  It looked like the actual programming of the headache had 
been divided up into small pieces and crowdsourced, so that none 
of the workers would know what was going on.  Huh.  So giving 
millions of people blinding headaches was apparently a purposeful 
liability avoidance strategy.  Rakoff swore under his breath.  Un-
believable, to cause people so much pain and then lie about its 
cause.  He would have cursed again but it was time to get off the 
train. 
As he jumped off, Rakoff pinged Margaret.  
*** 
Luckily Margaret was free for dinner.  Rakoff paid a special 
“privacy bar” three times the amount he’d normally spend on din-
ner, because he wanted a restaurant free from bugs and surveil-
lance cameras.  If you wanted privacy these days, you could have 
it, but it came at a price.  Despite paying a drone and a leg, Rakoff 
swept the area carefully, for safety’s sake.  Shady characters and 
avatars flitted by him, partially cloaked.  A holographic electronic 
New Orleans-style jazz band was playing a peppy funeral dirge in 
the corner.  Rakoff did his sweep quickly so that he wouldn’t have 
to endure Margaret chiding him for paying all the extra money 
and being paranoid at the same time.     
“So.  How do I do it, sis?” 
“Do what?” asked Margaret. 
“Stop the headaches.  Stop these ridiculous terms that no one 
reads and everyone hates.  I just want them to go away.” 
“Well, I’ve told you about that, Rakoff.  The courts think it’s 
more efficient this way.11  Either the legislatures are being lobbied 
by businesses, or they just don’t care.  It’s been this way so long 
that everyone gripes about it but no one does anything.” 
  
 11. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right 
to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of 
doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”).  
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“Margaret, I understand that.  But it’s not sustainable anymore.  
They lied to us.  It’s not a bug.  The terms give us those headaches 
on purpose.  For consumers, the system is broken, if it ever 
worked to begin with . . . which it sounds like it hasn’t since some-
time in pre-industrial Britain.” 
“Can’t argue with you there, Rakoff.” 
“Well, what’s the issue, the loophole?  How do I get it to stop?” 
Margaret thought carefully before leaning in closely.   
Maybe Margaret was paranoid about surveillance too, Rakoff 
thought.  As Margaret whispered into his ear, Rakoff started to 
grin.  Sometimes you just needed good legal advice.  This was go-
ing to be great. 
*** 
A week later, and Rakoff was waiting for the bullet train again.  
He and Margaret had read the terms and conditions for train ser-
vice extremely carefully, checking and rechecking every provision.   
The bullet train pulled up, and the terms and conditions down-
load started.  Rakoff stayed calm and practiced his yoga breathing 
exercises.  Yes, this was the way to do it.  As Rakoff exhaled, the 
terms and conditions download froze.  Seventy percent of those 
boarding the train looked at each other, in the real world, in real 
time, in real surprise . . . at not being hit with a blinding head-
ache. 
Now the question, Rakoff pondered, is what would happen next?  
Would the train shut down, now that the terms and conditions 
were disabled?  If the train was dead on the tracks, then Rakoff’s 
strategy wouldn’t have worked and he’d have to hightail it out of 
there and cover his tracks very carefully.  Forget the breathing 
exercises, Rakoff was now literally holding his breath to see what 
would happen. 
The automated announcer came on, as usual, and guided typical 
boarding procedures, minus the terms and conditions.  Rakoff 
couldn’t believe his luck.  The other passengers seemed strangely 
elated at skipping the headache-inducing download.  Rakoff slowly 
sauntered onto the next train car, his kilt freshly ironed, and with 
his bouquet of hyacinths, ready to finish the train ride that would 
take him to his date with Nancy. 
*** 
Even before the train ride was over, the crowdsourced news 
about the terms and conditions knock-out hit the ’net.  Passengers 
wrote and uploaded whole reports and stories to the ’net detailing 
what had happened on the train.  It was so unusual to not be 
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bombarded by terms-induced headaches that the story of the “free 
ride” went viral.  Rakoff could trace the story spreading across the 
virtuality as he walked down two familiar side streets.   
Not only that, but hackers across the web had also picked up the 
story about the headaches being deliberate, not a bug in the sys-
tem. 
Netizens were outraged at how many unnecessary headaches 
they’d had to endure.  Bullet train passengers in all cities across 
the globe were now demanding, through their implants, an end to 
the terms and conditions.  Since the trains could obviously run 
without the terms, the passengers were getting their way.  Within 
only ten minutes, stories were trending upward about the proper 
way to handle terms and conditions in the new technological age.   
*** 
Nancy put the hyacinths in a vase and sighed.   
“Okay.  I accept what you did.  I think I even understand why 
and support your actions.  Everyone is tired of those terms and 
who wants headaches?  But what I want to know is, how did you 
and Margaret do it?” 
Rakoff thought quickly.  It was no good trying to cover things 
over with Nancy.  She knew this had his handiwork all over it.  
After a year since they’d reconnected—granted, some of that on 
and some off—she just knew him too well for him to try to hide 
anything.  Probably a good sign. 
“Margaret and I scrutinized both the terms and conditions of 
the visual implant that I and most of the passengers had, and 
then the terms and conditions that were being downloaded from 
the bullet train.” 
As he was about to finish his explanation, a story came across 
the virtuality from the crowdsourced media.  They explained 
Rakoff’s plan better than even he could, so he sent the news link 
to Nancy’s bracelet. 
“Ah,” she said.  “Smart.  So you had your visual implant jack 
everyone else’s and send the implants’ terms and conditions to the 
train at the same instant that the train was trying to download its 
terms and conditions to its passengers.  Says here that the con-
flicting and inflexible contract terms caused some type of infinite 
loop in the train’s processing core.  But because the terms were 
never a vital component of actually running the train, the pro-
gramming could skip them and still keep the trains running.  
Meanwhile, because the entire crowd on the train had their visual 
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implants involved, you weren’t implicated in the subsequent data 
trace.  Very clever.” 
Rakoff nodded.  “My implant had a term demanding resolution 
of any claims by a virtual arbitrator, and the train’s terms forbade 
virtual arbitrators.  It essentially created a ‘dueling EULA’ situa-
tion, which couldn’t be resolved by the computers and resulted in a 
meltdown.  Now that people know about this, the EULAs are his-
tory.” 
A minute later, both Rakoff and Nancy watched as groups of 
implant users banded together in both Tokyo and Nairobi to find 
the conflicts in the EULAs and to take down the terms and condi-
tions on three crowdsourcing work websites. 
*** 
The next morning, Margaret appeared as legal advisor on “Talk 
of the Net.”  She noted that adhesion contracts had not been kind 
to consumers, even before the ’net, the virtuality, and implants.   
She analogized the “dueling EULA” situation to an old legal doc-
trine called the “Battle of the Forms” where old-time merchants 
used to send each other differing printed forms in the mail.12  The 
last version that was sent was the “last shot,” and it controlled the 
terms.13  Later, more complicated rules arose that compromised 
between the merchant forms, but even the best lawyers barely 
understood the rules, that was how complex they were.14  All that 
said, consumers never had the same kind of bargaining power or 
access to counsel that merchants did.  Consumers didn’t even have 
their own forms.  That was, until now. 
Netizens around the globe had started a crowdsourcing website 
to create forms.  Margaret noted that people were working around 
the clock, from Oslo to Vanuatu, to come up with consumer-
friendly forms that would, in the process, conflict with the existing 
forms to invalidate them temporarily.  Margaret was acting as 
legal counsel.  With technology as an equalizer, there would be a 
way to establish a set of default terms that would be more visible 
and more democratic for consumers and merchants.  A system 
could be established that was both fair and efficient.    
  
 12. See MURRAY, supra note 10, at 172-73 (“Winning the ‘Battle of the Forms’ at Com-
mon Law – the Last Shot Principle”). 
 13. Id. at 173 (“The seller ‘won’ the ‘battle of the forms’ simply because it fired the last 
shot in the battle.”).  
 14. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2012); MURRAY, supra note 10, at 176 (explaining that the “cele-
brated” or “infamous” Section 2-207 was designed to remedy the possible injustice in the 
application of the “last shot rule”). 
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Rakoff smiled as he watched the news and stepped onto the bul-
let train to head back home, with Nancy’s bracelet on his arm, and 
without a headache. 
 
